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Abstract 
 
This paper considers what light experimental work on the development of irony 
comprehension can shed on the relation between echoic and pretence accounts of irony, and 
how theoretical debates about the nature of irony might suggest fruitful directions for future 
developmental research. After surveying the results of developmental studies of three 
distinctive features of verbal irony – the expression of a characteristic attitude, the normative 
bias in the uses of irony and the ‘ironical tone of voice’ – it considers how echoic and 
pretence accounts of irony might explain these results. On the theoretical side, it argues that 
echoing and pretence are distinct mechanisms which can be used independently of each other, 
and that verbal irony necessarily involves echoic use, but does not necessarily involve 
pretence. On the experimental side, it argues that a range of disparate phenomena including 
hyperbole, jocularity, understatement and rhetorical questions, which are generally treated as 
forms of irony in the developmental literature, display none of the distinctive features of 
irony in most of their uses, and are not inherently ironical. However, these phenomena are 
worth investigating in their own right, and new theoretical accounts and experimental 
paradigms are needed to prise them apart. 
1. Introduction 
Typical examples of verbal irony such as (1) and (2) are widely used not only in literary 
works but in everyday conversation: 
 
(1) Mary (after a chaotic lecture): That went well. 
(2)  Sue (of a friend who has gossiped behind her back): You can always count on Jane.  
 
Irony is traditionally described as a matter of saying one thing and meaning the opposite. 
According to classical rhetoric, metaphor and irony are tropes in which the literal meaning is 
replaced by a related figurative meaning: in metaphor, this is a related simile or comparison, 
as in (3)-(4), and in irony, it is the contrary or contradictory of the literal meaning, so that (1)-
(2) would convey (5)-(6): 
 
(3) Sally is a butterfly 
(4) Sally is like a butterfly. 
(5)  That didn’t go well / That went badly 
(6) You can’t always count on Jane / You can never count on Jane 
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Grice’s brief discussion of tropes proposed a modern pragmatic variant of the classical 
account, in which the ‘figurative meanings’ in (4)-(6) are reanalysed as implicatures triggered 
by blatant violation of the first Quality maxim (Do not say what you believe to be false) 
(Grice 1967/1989: 34). 
 
These traditional accounts are based on the assumption that metaphor and irony are cut to the 
same pattern. To the extent that they have implications for the processing of figurative 
utterances, they predict that metaphor and irony should be processed on similar lines, show 
similar developmental patterns and break down in similar ways. Yet a growing body of 
experimental work casts doubt on these predictions, suggesting that metaphor and irony 
follow different developmental trajectories, require different orders of metarepresentational 
ability and break down in different ways. At the same time, serious weaknesses have been 
found in the traditional accounts of figurative utterances, and alternative models have been 
proposed.  
 
The most serious weakness of the classical and Gricean accounts is that they do not explain 
why figurative utterances should exist at all. According to classical rhetoric, metaphor and 
irony have a decorative value that distinguishes them from their literal counterparts; but it is 
not explained why, in culture after culture, saying the opposite of what one means should 
have been found aesthetically pleasing (as opposed to merely irrational) . The standard 
Gricean account makes no appeal to decorative value, and treats the figurative utterances in 
(1)-(3) as conveying no more than could have been conveyed by directly asserting (4)-(6). 
Yet on this account, the interpretation of (1)-(3) necessarily involves rejecting their literal 
meanings (in Grice’s terms, what the speaker has “said or made as if to say”) and 
constructing the appropriate implicatures. It should follow that (1)-(3) are more costly to 
process than their literal counterparts, but yield no extra benefit, which makes their use 
irrational and a waste of effort. Moreover, experimental studies suggest that at least some 
figurative interpretations are no harder to construct than literal interpretations, contrary to the 
predictions of this ‘literal-first’ model (Gibbs, 1986, 1994; Dews and Winner 1999; 
Schwoebel et al., 2000; Giora, 2003; Glucksberg, 2001). 
 
Most post-Gricean theories of irony can be seen as either variants of, or reactions to, the 
echoic theory first proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1981) (and developed in a series of later 
works e.g. Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 1998, 2012; Wilson and Sperber, 1992). According to 
the echoic account, the speaker of an ironical utterance such as (1) or (2) is not saying the 
opposite of what she means, but echoing a thought (e.g. a belief, an intention, a norm-based 
expectation) she attributes to an individual, a group, or to people in general, and expressing a 
mocking, scornful or contemptuous attitude to this thought. Thus, when Mary in (1) says, 
after a chaotic lecture, That went well, she is neither asserting literally that the lecture went 
well nor asserting ‘ironically’ that the lecture want badly, but expressing a mocking, scornful 
or contemptuous attitude towards (say) her own hopes or expectations that the lecture would 
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go well. This approach was experimentally tested by Jorgensen, Miller and Sperber (1984), 
which proposed a new paradigm for experimental research on irony. 
 
Under the direct or indirect influence of these two papers, much current work on irony rejects 
both the traditional description of irony and the classical and Gricean accounts that underlie 
it. What the speaker of (1) or (2) is taken to communicate is neither the proposition expressed 
by the ironical utterance nor the opposite of that proposition, but an attitude to this 
proposition and to those who have held or might hold it. For instance, Kreuz and Glucksberg 
(1989) propose an ‘echoic reminder’ theory on which the point of an ironical utterance is to 
remind the hearer of the thought it echoes (according to Wilson and Sperber 2012, this is 
indeed quite often, though not invariably, the case). By far the most influential variation of 
Sperber and Wilson’s account, and also the most critical one, is the pretence theory proposed 
as an alternative to the echoic account in a pioneering paper by Clark and Gerrig (1984) and 
extended in Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg and Brown’s (1995) ‘allusional pretence’ 
account. According to pretence theories, the speaker of an ironical utterance is not seriously 
performing a speech act such as making an assertion or asking a question, but merely 
pretending to perform one, while expecting her audience to see through the pretence and 
detect the mocking or contemptuous attitude behind it. Thus, Mary in (1) is merely 
pretending to assert that the lecture went well, while expressing her own scornful attitude to 
the speech act itself, and to anyone who would perform it or take it seriously.  
 
Some of the implications of the echoic and pretence accounts have been tested in studies of 
irony comprehension in adults (Jorgensen, Miller and Sperber, 1984; Gibbs, 1986, 1994; 
Kreuz and Glucksberg, 1989; Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg and Brown, 1995; McDonald, 
2000; Giora, 2003). On the developmental side, however, with a few notable exceptions, the 
links between theories and experimental work have been rather less direct. As Marlena 
Creusere (1999: 256-7) puts it, 
 
While many of the studies related to children’s understanding of irony may be consistent 
with and possibly influenced by theories of adults’ understanding of verbal irony, few 
developmental investigations have specifically tested the claims made within these 
perspectives.) 
 
She goes on to comment, 
 
Just as consideration of theories concerning adults’ use and processing of irony and 
sarcasm is likely to inform researchers interested in pragmatic language development, 
attention to the results of developmental studies of non-literal speech-act comprehension 
is certain to enlighten those interested in pragmatic theory (Creusere 1999: 258). 
 
 My aim in this paper is to consider what light the growing literature on the development of 
irony comprehension can shed on the relation between echoic and pretence accounts, and 
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how theoretical debates on the nature of irony might point out fruitful directions for future 
developmental research.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, I look at three distinctive features of verbal 
irony which are puzzling from the perspective of the classical and Gricean accounts and 
consider what can be learned about them from the developmental literature.  In sections 3 and 
4, I outline the echoic and pretence accounts of irony and consider what light they shed on the 
features of irony discussed in section 2. In section 5, I draw some practical and theoretical 
conclusions and point out some possible directions for future research. 
 
On the theoretical side, the echoic and pretence accounts have much in common. Both reject 
the classical and Gricean accounts of irony, both offer a rationale for irony, and both take 
ironical utterances such as (1)-(2) as crucially involving the expression of a characteristic 
(mocking, scornful or contemptuous) attitude. Partly for this reason, the two accounts are 
sometimes seen as empirically or theoretically indistinguishable: several hybrid versions 
containing elements of both have been produced, and the boundaries between them have 
become increasingly blurred. I will argue that the two theories are not equivalent: echoing 
and pretence are distinct mechanisms which can operate independently of each other 
(although they may occasionally combine), and it is the echoic mechanism, not the pretence 
mechanism, that explains the distinctive features of irony. 
 
On the experimental side, one consequence of the move away from the traditional description 
of verbal irony as saying one thing and meaning the opposite has been a considerable 
broadening in the range of phenomena seen as falling within the scope of a theory of irony. 
Classic treatments of irony such as Booth (1984) or Muecke (1969) implicitly acknowledge 
that the traditional description is too narrow by including in their discussions not only regular 
declaratives such as (1)-(2), but also interrogatives and imperatives such as (7)-(8) and 
hyperboles such as (9), which can indeed be used to express the characteristic ironical 
attitude without saying the opposite of what they mean: 
 
(7) (to an obsessively cautious driver): Did you remember to check the rear-view mirror? 
(8) (to someone who has dropped a plate of food): Go ahead and ruin my carpet. 
(9) (after a boring lecture): I was on the edge of my seat. 
 
In the recent experimental literature, the notion of irony has been broadened still further, and 
is now often taken to include rhetorical questions such as (10), hyperboles such as (11) and 
various forms of teasing or banter such as (12), which would not be traditionally regarded as 
ironical at all: 
 
(10) (to a child throwing toys around): How many times do I have to tell you to stop? 
(11) (of a big sandwich): This is the biggest sandwich in the world. 
(12) (to a close friend coming into the room): Here comes trouble! 
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Having rejected the traditional description of irony, how can we decide whether such 
broadenings are legitimate or not? 
  
Throughout its history, the term ‘irony’ has been applied to a very wide range of loosely 
related phenomena, not all of which fall squarely within the domain of pragmatics defined as 
a theory of overt communication and comprehension (e.g., situational irony, dramatic irony, 
Romantic irony and irony of fate do not).  Of those that are properly pragmatic, some are 
clearly forms of echoic use, others indeed involve pretence, while still others have no more in 
common with (1)–(2) than the presence of a mocking attitude or the evocation of a 
discrepancy between representation and reality. It should not be taken for granted that all 
these phenomena work in the same way, or that our goal in constructing a theory of irony 
should be to capture the very broad and vague extension of the common meaning of the term. 
The goal of a theory is to identify mechanisms and see what range of phenomena they 
explain. I will argue that the distinctive features of irony discussed in the next section are the 
key to the mechanism for irony comprehension, that many of the phenomena currently 
grouped together in the developmental literature as “various forms of irony” exploit different 
mechanisms, and that new theoretical accounts and experimental paradigms are needed to 
prise them apart. 
 
2. Distinctive features of irony 
Irony has three distinctive features which have often been remarked on in the history of 
rhetoric, but which are puzzling from the classical and Gricean points of view. All three have 
been investigated in the developmental literature and found to be present quite early. An 
adequate theory of irony should explain why this is so. 
 
A. The role of attitude in irony 
After briefly introducing his account of figurative utterances, Grice discusses a possible 
counterexample to his treatment of irony: 
 
A and B are walking down the street, and they both see a car with a shattered window. B 
says, Look, that car has all its windows intact. A is baffled. B says, You didn’t catch on; I 
was in an ironical way drawing your attention to the broken window. (Grice, 1967/1989: 
53) 
 
This example meets all Grice’s conditions on irony – the speaker “says or makes as if to say” 
something blatantly false, intending to implicate the opposite – but the result would not 
normally be seen as ironical. Grice suggests that what is missing from his account may be the 
fact that irony involves the expression of a “hostile or derogatory judgment or a feeling such 
as indignation or contempt” (Grice, 1967/1989: 53). Neither the role of attitude in irony nor 
the fact that irony has a characteristic attitude while metaphor does not has a straightforward 
explanation in the Gricean framework, where metaphor and irony are both treated as blatant 
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violations of the first Quality maxim, designed to convey a related implicature. Why should 
one type of violation involve the expression of a characteristic attitude and the other not? 
 
In the developmental literature, the role of attitude in irony has been approached in two ways. 
Verbal irony (and sarcasm in particular) often has a specific ‘target’ or ‘victim’: the person 
who is the object of the speaker’s “hostile or derogatory judgement” or “feeling such as 
indignation or contempt”. One way of testing children’s ability to recognise this attitude is to 
ask them how “nice” or “mean” the speaker is being. In a study by Dews et al. (1996), for 
instance, 5-6 year olds, 8-9 year olds and adults saw cartoon clips showing scenarios such as 
the following, ending in remarks interpretable as literal criticisms, literal compliments or 
ironic criticisms: 
 
Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles 
The turtles try to get a computer expert to show them how he did something on a 
computer. The computer expert just walks away. One turtle remarks, “Helpful, isn’t he?” 
 
Participants who passed a comprehension question (e.g. “Did the turtle mean that the man 
was helpful and nice, or selfish and not co-operating?”) then indicated how mean they 
thought speaker was by circling one of four faces representing different degrees of meanness: 
very very mean, very mean, a teeny bit mean, and not mean at all. In all three groups, ironic 
criticisms were ranked as meaner than literal compliments but less mean than literal 
criticisms, with the difference between literal compliments and ironic criticisms increasing 
with age (this is sometimes known as the ‘muting’ function of irony; see Colston, 1997; 
Glenwright and Pexman, 2003; Filippova and Astington, 2010) 
 
However, eliciting judgements about whether the speaker is being nice or mean is a rather 
blunt tool for tracking the child’s ability to recognise the mocking, scornful or contemptuous 
attitude characteristic of irony. Although all ironical utterances express such an attitude, only 
some have a definite target or victim and are therefore likely to be perceived as hurtful or 
mean. Consider (13), said in a downpour – a typical case of verbal irony: 
 
(13) It’s lovely weather. 
 
If someone other than the speaker has wrongly predicted good weather, (13) would have a 
definite target or victim – the person who made the prediction and anyone who took it 
seriously – and the utterance might well be perceived as mean. On many occasions of 
utterance, though, the speaker would merely be commenting ironically on the general frailty 
of human hopes: in that case, (13) would have no definite target or victim, and the remark 
would not be appropriately described as hurtful or mean. But whether or not there is a 
definite target or victim, (13) still expresses the characteristic ironical attitude, which is 
directed not at a person but at a thought. 
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A second line of research takes seriously the idea that irony involves a ‘thought about a 
thought’, and should therefore require a higher order of mindreading ability than metaphor. In 
a classic paper, Francesca Happé (1993) tested metaphor and irony comprehension in 
typically developing children and young people with autism, using stories such as the 
following: 
 
David is helping his mother make a cake. She leaves him to add the eggs to the flour and 
sugar. But silly David doesn’t break the eggs first – he just puts them in the bowl, shells 
and all. What a silly thing to do! When mother comes back and sees what David has 
done, she says: 
 “Your head is made out of wood!” 
Q1: What does David’s mother mean? Does she mean that David is clever or silly? 
Just then father comes in. He sees what David has done and he says: 
 “What a clever boy you are, David!” 
Q2: What does David’s father mean? Does he mean David is clever, or silly? 
 
The stories were interrupted at two points with comprehension questions: Question 1 tests the 
comprehension of metaphor and Question 2 tests the comprehension of irony. Participants 
also took standard first- and second-order false-belief tasks, which are generally seen as 
revealing orders of ‘mindreading’ ability, and a significant correlation emerged: participants 
who passed no false-belief tests understood neither metaphorical nor ironical utterances; 
those who passed only first-order false belief tests understood some metaphorical but no 
ironical utterances, and those who passed both first-order and second-order false-belief tests 
understood both metaphorical and ironical utterances. On the assumption that standard false-
belief tasks test orders of mindreading ability, it should follow that irony requires a higher 
order of mindreading ability than metaphor, thus confirming the prediction that irony 
involves a ‘thought about a thought’.1 This fits with the consensus in the developmental 
literature that irony comprehension develops considerably later than metaphor 
comprehension – typically, between the ages of five and six, when the ability to pass standard 
second-order false belief tasks has just emerged (Winner, 1988; Capelli et al., 1990; Creusere, 
1999, 2000; Keenan and Quigley, 1999; Nakassis and Snedeker, 2002; Pexman and Glenwright, 
2007).  
 
B. The normative bias in irony 
There is a widely noted normative bias in the uses of irony which is puzzling from the 
perspective of the classical or Gricean accounts. The most common use of irony is to criticise 
or complain when a situation, event or performance does not live up to some norm-based 
                                                 
1 While the correlation Happé found between irony comprehension and success in second-order false-
belief tests has proved fairly robust, the correlation between metaphor comprehension and success in 
first-order false belief tests has proved rather less robust: some metaphors are understood by people 
who do not pass standard false-belief tests at all (Langdon, Davies and Coltheart, 2002; Norbury, 
2005).  
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expectation (lectures are supposed to go smoothly; friends ought not to gossip behind our 
backs). Only in special circumstances can irony be used to praise or reassure, or to point out 
that some proposition lacking in normative content is false. So when someone cheats, it is 
always possible to say ironically, What an honest man, but when someone behaves honestly, 
the circumstances in which one can say ironically, What a cheat are very limited: such 
negative ironical comments are only appropriate when some doubt about the honesty of the 
person in question has been entertained or expressed. The classical and Gricean accounts 
suggest no explanation for this asymmetry between positive and negative forms of irony. 
 
The presence of a normative bias in irony comprehension in adults was experimentally 
confirmed by Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989) using alternative versions of stories such as the 
following, with the italicised sentence either present or absent: 
 
Nancy and her friend Jane were planning a trip to the beach. 
“It’s probably going to rain tomorrow”, said Jane, who worked for a local TV station as a 
meteorologist. 
The next day was a warm and sunny one. 
As she looked out of the window, Nancy said, “This certainly is awful weather.” 
 
The results showed that participants were more likely to judge the ironical comment 
appropriate when it was preceded by the explicit prediction that the weather would be bad. 
By contrast, in positive versions such as the one below, the ironical comment was judged 
equally appropriate whether or not the italicised sentence was present:  
 
Nancy and her friend Jane were planning a trip to the beach. 
“The weather should be nice tomorrow”, said Jane, who worked for a local TV station as 
a meteorologist. 
The next day was a cold and stormy one. 
As she looked out of the window, Nancy said, “This certainly is beautiful weather.” 
 
Interestingly, this normative bias has been shown to be present from the outset, in children as 
young as 5 or 6. Hancock, Dunham and Purdy (2000) tested 5-6-year olds on their 
comprehension of ‘ironic criticisms’ and ‘ironic compliments’, using videotaped stories 
showing exchanges such as the following, containing one or other of the italicised words: 
 
 Weight-Lifter Story (critical version) 
 A:  I’m [good/bad] at lifting weights.   [A fails to lift weight] 
 B: You really are good at lifting weights. [Ironic criticism] 
  
 Weight-Lifter Story (complimentary version) 
 A:  I’m [good/bad] at lifting weights.  [A lifts weight] 
 B: You really are bad at lifting weights.  [Ironic compliment] 
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Here, the ironic criticism You really are good at lifting weights, said to someone who has 
failed, was understood equally well whether it was preceded by a boastful remark (I’m good 
at lifting weights) or a self-critical one (I’m bad at lifting weights). By contrast, the ‘ironic 
compliment’ You really are bad at lifting weights was understood significantly more often 
when preceded by the self-critical remark I’m bad at lifting weights (which it could be seen as 
ironically echoing) than by the boastful remark I’m good at lifting weights (see also Dews et 
al., 1996; Creusere, 2000; Glenwright & Pexman, 2003; Pexman et al., 2005; Astington and 
Filippova 2010.) 
 
C. The ironical tone of voice 
A further difference between irony and metaphor which is not explained by the classical or 
Gricean accounts is that irony, but not metaphor, has a characteristic tone of voice. This is 
characterised by a flat or deadpan intonation, slower tempo, lower pitch level and greater 
intensity than are found in the corresponding literal utterances (Ackerman, 1983; Rockwell, 
2000; Bryant and Fox-Tree, 2005; Bryant, 2010), and is generally seen as an optional cue to 
the speaker’s mocking, scornful or contemptuous attitude. Thus, Rockwell (2000: 485) treats 
the vocal cues to sarcasm – a subtype of irony which she defines as “a sharply mocking or 
contemptuous ironic remark intended to wound another” – as closely related to those for 
contempt or disgust, and suggests that they may be the prosodic counterparts of facial 
expressions such as “a sneer, rolling eyes, or deadpan expression.” Since not all vocal or 
facial expressions of mockery, contempt or disgust are perceived as ironical, the challenge for 
theories of irony is explain what makes some such expressions of attitude ironical, while 
others are not.  
 
There has been some debate in the developmental literature about how far the ironical tone of 
voice contributes to children’s irony comprehension, but several studies suggest that it can 
play a significant facilitating role. For instance, Keenan and Quigley (1999) tested irony 
comprehension in 6-, 8- and 10-year olds using stories such as the following, containing one 
or other of the italicised sentences: 
 
Red shoes story 
One night, Lucy was going to a party. Lucy was all dressed up in her new party dress, 
ready to go, but she didn’t have her party shoes on. Lucy didn’t want to run upstairs with 
her nice dress on, so she called to her brother Linus who was upstairs reading. She 
yelled, “Linus, please bring me my nice red party shoes! [I want to look pretty for the 
party /I have to hurry or I’ll be late].” So Linus, who was still reading his book, went to 
Lucy’s closet and by mistake, he picked up Lucy’s dirty old running shoes. When he 
went downstairs to hand them to Lucy, she looked at them and said, “Oh great. Now I’ll 
really look pretty.” 
 
Half the children in each age group were assigned to a ‘vocal intonation’ condition in which 
Lucy’s final utterance was delivered in a sarcastic tone of voice, while the other half heard 
the same utterance with neutral intonation. The results showed that sarcastic intonation 
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significantly increased irony comprehension across all three age groups, and in both versions 
of the story. In the neutral intonation condition, by contrast, the children performed 
significantly better when Lucy’s final utterance was preceded by the comment I want to look 
pretty for the party (which it could be understood as echoing) than by the unrelated comment 
I have to hurry or I’ll be late (see also Milosky and Ford, 1997; Nakassis and Snedeker, 
2002; Laval and Bert-Erboul, 2005). 
 
As an interesting sidelight, it is sometimes noted in the experimental literature that the 
speaker of an ironical utterance can optionally use not just the regular ‘ironical tone of voice’ 
but another perceptibly different tone of voice. Laval and Bert-Erboul (2005: 612) comment: 
 
Several types of intonation can be used to express sarcasm…: A person may use a 
monotonic intonation (e.g., saying “won-der-ful” in an exaggerated monotone to reply to 
an addressee who tells you about a mandatory meeting at 8.00 p.m. when you have a 
tennis match scheduled) or an intonation that conveys excessive enthusiasm (e.g., using 
an overly enthusiastic tone of voice to say, “Hey, you should drive faster!” to a person 
who is going 60 miles an hour when the speed limit is 30). 
 
Here, the first, “monotonic” type of intonation is the one traditionally described as the 
ironical tone of voice. The challenge for theories of irony is to explain why ironical 
utterances can be produced not only in this tone of voice but also a second, “overly 
enthusiastic” one.  
 
In the next two sections, I will outline the echoic and pretence accounts of irony and consider 
what light they shed on the distinctive features of irony discussed in this section. My main 
claim will be that the echoic account straightforwardly explains all these features, whereas 
non-echoic versions of the pretence account do not explain them at all; while hybrid echoic-
pretence accounts can borrow the explanation offered by the echoic account, they do not add 
anything to it and would work just as well without the appeal to pretence.  
 
3. How the echoic account explains the distinctive features of irony 
 
Echoic use is a technical term in relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995: chapter 4, 
sections 7-10; Wilson, 2006; Wilson and Sperber, 2012). The easiest way to present it is to 
contrast it with tacit reports of speech and thought such as (14)-(15): 
 
(14) The President spoke up. The country was in crisis. 
(15) The voters were thoughtful. If they didn’t act now, it might be too late. 
 
How are the italicised sentences in (14)-(15) to be understood? A plausible interpretation of 
(14) (though not the only one) is that the speaker is not herself claiming that the country was 
in crisis, but tacitly attributing such a claim to the President. Similarly, a plausible 
interpretation of (15) is that the speaker is tacitly attributing to the students the thought that if 
11 
 
they didn’t act now, it might be too late. The main point of such tacit reports of speech or 
thought is to inform the audience about the content of an attributed utterance or thought. 
 
Now consider the italicised sentences in (17a)-(17c), three possible responses by Sue to 
Jack’s announcement in (16) that he has finished a paper he’s been working on all year:  
 
(16) Jack:  I’ve finally finished my paper. 
(17) a. Sue (happily): You’ve finished your paper! Let’s celebrate! 
 b. Sue (cautiously): You’ve finished your paper. Really completely finished? 
 c. Sue (dismissively): You’ve finished your paper. How often have I heard you 
say that? 
 
It is easy to see that the italicised sentences in (17a)-(17c) have a different function from 
those in (14)-(15): Sue is not intending to inform Jack about the content of a thought he has 
only just expressed, but to show him that she is thinking about it and to convey her own 
attitude or reaction to it. In (17a), she indicates that she accepts it as true and is thinking about 
its consequences; in (17b), she reserves judgement about it, and in (17c), she indicates that 
she does not believe it at all. According to Sperber and Wilson, these are echoic uses of 
language, whose main function is not to inform the audience about the content of an 
attributed thought, but to show that the speaker has that thought in mind and wants to convey 
her own attitude or reaction to it.  
 
The attitudes that can be conveyed in an echoic utterance range from acceptance and 
endorsement of the attributed thought, as in (17a), through various shades of doubt or 
scepticism, as in (17b), to outright rejection, as in (17c). According to the echoic account, 
what distinguishes verbal irony from other types of echoic use is that the attitude conveyed is 
drawn from the dissociative range: the speaker rejects a tacitly attributed thought as 
ludicrously false (or blatantly inadequate in other ways). Thus, (17c) is a typical case of 
verbal irony. 
 
The central claims of the echoic account may be summed up as follows. The point of an 
ironical utterance is to express the speaker’s own dissociative (e.g. mocking, scornful or 
contemptuous) attitude to a thought similar in content to the one expressed in her utterance, 
which she attributes to some source other than herself at the current time. The thought being 
echoed need not have been overtly expressed in an utterance: it may be an unexpressed belief, 
hope, wish or norm-based expectation (e.g. that a certain lecture will run as it should, a 
certain friend will behave as she should, and so on). The source of the thought may be a 
specific person, a type of person, or people in general; and it is only when the source is a 
specific person or type of person that the irony will have a definite target or victim. Finally, 
the proposition expressed by the ironical utterance need not be identical in content to the 
thought being echoed: it may be a paraphrase or summary of the original, may pick out one of 
its implications, or may be a caricature or exaggeration used to cue the audience to the 
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speaker’s mocking, sceptical or contemptuous attitude (on the use of hyperbole as a cue to 
irony, see Kreuz and Roberts, 1995). 
 
Here is how this account explains the distinctive features of irony discussed in section 2. 
 
The role of attitude in irony 
The echoic account straightforwardly explains why irony expresses a characteristic attitude 
while metaphor does not. According to the echoic account, the main point of irony is to 
express the speaker’s mocking, scornful or contemptuous attitude to an echoed thought. 
Within this framework, the ironical attitude is not a puzzling feature added to a specific kind 
of trope: it is constitutive of irony. This account also helps to explain why some ironical 
utterances are mean or hurtful while others are not. Although the ironical attitude is directly 
targeted at attributed thoughts, it may be indirectly targeted (particularly in sarcasm) at 
specific people, or types of people, who entertain such thoughts or take them seriously, and in 
those cases it may be perceived as hurtful or mean. Dissociative attitudes themselves vary 
quite widely, falling anywhere on a spectrum from amused tolerance through various shades 
of resignation or disappointment to contempt, disgust, outrage or scorn. The more specific the 
target, and the more aggressive the attitude, the more likely the utterance is to be judged as 
hurtful or mean. 
 
The echoic account predicts that in Grice’s scenario of the car with a broken window, what 
would make the utterance Look, that car has all its windows intact a genuine case of irony is 
some evidence that it is being echoically used to dissociate the speaker from an attributed 
thought. In the absence of such a thought, there is nothing that the speaker can be seen as 
ironically echoing, and hence no irony. However, add to the scenario the assumption that as 
we walk down the street, I have been worrying aloud about whether it is safe to leave my car 
there overnight and you have been trying to reassure me. At that point, we come across a car 
with a broken window. Then my utterance, Look, that car has all its windows intact could be 
seen as ironically echoing your assurances in order to show how ill-founded they have turned 
out to be. No irony without an ironical attitude, no ironical attitude without echoing of an 
attributed thought.  
 
Happé’s (1993) paper on metaphor and irony comprehension was designed to test the 
prediction of the echoic account that irony expresses a thought about a thought whereas 
metaphor expresses a thought about a state of affairs in the world. In interpreting her results, 
Happé relied on the assumption that different orders of false-belief task are linked to different 
orders of mindreading ability, from which it would follow directly that irony involves a 
higher order of mindreading ability than metaphor. Recent work with non-verbal versions of 
the false-belief task has shown that in fact, infants are already able to attribute false beliefs 
long before typically developing children pass standard first-order verbal false-belief tests 
(generally, around the age of four) (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi and Sperber, 
2007; Southgate, Chevallier and Csibra, 2010). This suggests that standard false-belief tasks do 
not provide adequate evidence on the developmental origins of the mindreading ability. Still, 
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success in different orders of false-belief task clearly requires different orders of mindreading 
ability: first-order tasks require the ability to attribute thoughts about states of affairs in the 
world, whereas second-order tasks require the ability to attribute thoughts about thoughts. So 
Happé’s results do confirm the predictions of the echoic account. 
 
The normative bias in irony 
The fact that irony is generally used to criticise or complain was described and discussed at 
length in classical rhetoric, but never properly explained. The echoic account provides a 
simple and convincing explanation. Norms are socially shared ideas about how things should 
be. We are all aware that people should be polite, helpful, stylish, trustworthy, lectures should 
run smoothly, actions should achieve their goal, the weather should be good, and so on. So 
when a particular event or action fails to live up to the norm, it is always possible to say 
ironically That was helpful, How clever, Well done, Lovely weather and so on, and be 
understood as echoing a norm-based expectation that should have been met. 
 
By contrast, it is not always possible to say ironically, What a cheat when someone is 
behaving honestly, How clumsy when someone is being graceful, Awful weather when the 
sun is shining, and so on. For irony to succeed in these cases, there must have been some 
manifest doubt or suspicion that the person in question might be dishonest or clumsy, the 
weather would be awful, and so on. Otherwise there will be no identifiable thought that the 
speaker can be understood as ironically echoing.2 The echoic account predicts that this 
normative bias is inherent to irony and should therefore be present from the outset, as 
Hancock, Dunham and Purdy (2000) have shown. 
 
The ironical tone of voice 
The echoic account straightforwardly accounts for the ‘ironical tone of voice’ described in 
the literature and explains why there is no corresponding metaphorical tone of voice. As 
noted above, the ironical tone of voice is an optional cue to the particular type of dissociative 
attitude – amused, tolerant, bitter, vicious – that the speaker intends to convey. Since 
metaphor is not echoic and does not involve the expression of a characteristic attitude, there 
is no reason why we should expect to find a corresponding metaphorical tone of voice. (On 
the second, “over-enthusiastic”, tone of voice discussed by Laval and Bert-Erboul 2005,, see 
section 4.) 
 
This account also sheds some light on the results obtained in Keenan and Quigley’s ‘Red 
Shoes Story’ described in section 2. The results showed that children in the ‘neutral 
                                                 
2 Incidentally, the echoic account predicts that negative ironical utterances such as What a cheat, or 
How clumsy, which are described in the experimental literature as “ironic compliments”, are not 
simply used to praise. Like all ironical utterances, they express a characteristic mocking, scornful or 
contemptuous attitude, and may well have as a target or victim whoever expressed the doubts that 
turned out to be false (Garmendia 2011). This may shed some light on the mixed results obtained by 
asking whether the speaker in such cases is being ‘nice’ or ‘mean’. 
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intonation’ condition – with no sarcastic tone of voice – understood Lucy’s utterance Now I’ll 
really look pretty as ironical significantly more often when it was preceded by the related 
comment I want to look pretty for the party than by the unrelated comment I have to hurry or 
I’ll be late. By contrast, those in the ‘vocal intonation condition’ – involving a sarcastic tone 
of voice – performed equally well with both versions. These results can be explained on the 
assumption that the use of sarcastic intonation and the presence of an earlier related comment 
which Lucy might be seen as echoing are (optional) cues to irony, so that when neither cue is 
present, the irony is more likely to be missed. 
 
4. How the pretence account explains the distinctive features of irony 
 
The central claim of most current pretence accounts of irony is that the speaker of an ironical 
utterance is not herself performing a speech act (e.g. making an assertion or asking a 
question) but pretending to perform one, in order to express a mocking, scornful or 
contemptuous attitude to the speech act itself, and to anyone who would perform it or take it 
seriously. Clark and Gerrig’s (1984) pretence theory, put forward as an alternative to the 
echoic account in a response to Jorgensen, Miller and Sperber (1984), was the inspiration for 
later pretence accounts such as Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg and Brown (1995), Recanati 
(2004, 2007) and Currie (2006, 2008).  
 
Jorgensen et al. had treated the remark See what lovely weather it is in (18) as an ironical 
echo of a prediction in the weather forecast: 
 
(18) Trust the Weather Bureau! See what lovely weather it is: rain, rain, rain. 
 
Clark and Gerrig (1984: 122) treat it as a type of pretence: 
 
With See what lovely weather it is, the speaker is pretending to be an unseeing person, 
perhaps a weather forecaster, exclaiming to an unknowing audience how beautiful the 
weather is. She intends the addressee to see through the pretense – in such rain she 
obviously could not be making the exclamation on her own behalf – and to see that she is 
thereby ridiculing the sort of person who would make such an exclamation (e.g. the 
weather forecaster), the sort of person who would accept it, and the exclamation itself. 
 
According to this account, understanding irony involves the ability to recognise that the 
speaker is pretending to perform a speech act and simultaneously expressing a certain type of 
(mocking, scornful or contemptuous) attitude to the speech act itself and to anyone who 
would take it seriously. 
 
As it stands, however, this version of the pretence account does not solve the problem raised 
by Grice’s counterexample, where the speaker points to a car with a broken window and says, 
Look, that car has all its windows intact. Even if we add to Grice’s scenario the assumption 
that the speaker is expressing a mocking, scornful or contemptuous attitude to the speech act 
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itself and to anyone who would perform it or take it seriously, the problem does not go away. 
After all, someone who seriously asserted that a car with an obviously broken window had all 
its windows intact would be no less worthy of ridicule or contempt than someone who 
seriously asserted that the weather is lovely when it’s pouring with rain. So why does the 
irony fall flat in one case and not in the other?  
 
According to the echoic account, what is missing from simpler versions of the pretence 
account is the assumption that for irony to succeed, the object of the ironical attitude must be 
a thought that the speaker is tacitly attributing to some actual person or type of person (or to 
people in general). Unless the pretence account is extended to include the assumption that 
irony is tacitly echoic or attributive, it is hard to see how it can handle either Grice’s 
counterexample or a wide range of examples constructed on a similar pattern, involving 
assertions which would be ridiculous if used in the circumstances, but which no-one has 
seriously made or even contemplated. 
 
In fact, the general idea behind the echoic account – that irony is necessarily echoic or 
attributive – has been quite widely accepted, although particular aspects of it have been 
criticised (and occasionally misconstrued). Several pretence theorists share the intuition that 
irony is tacitly attributive, but also maintain that irony involves the simulation or imitation of 
a (real or imagined) speech act, and is therefore a case of pretence. Hybrid echoic-pretence 
accounts differ from simpler versions of the pretence account by claiming that irony is 
necessarily attributive, and from the echoic account by claiming that irony also necessarily 
involves pretence.  
 
Perhaps the best known attributive-pretence account of irony, and also the one most widely 
used in the experimental literature, is Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg and Brown’s (1995: 61) 
‘allusional pretence’ account, which involves elements of both attribution and pretence. The 
attributive element is introduced through the requirement that an ironical utterance must 
“allude to some prior expectation, norm or convention that has been violated in one way or 
another”. The pretence element is added to deal with a variety of cases which Kumon-
Nakamura et al. see as allusive but not properly echoic in Sperber and Wilson’s sense. These 
include ironical assertions such as (19), questions such as (20), offers such as (21) and 
requests such as (22): 
 
(19) (to someone arrogantly showing off their knowledge): You sure know a lot. 
(20) (to someone acting inappropriately for their age): How old did you say you were? 
(21) (to someone who has just gobbled the whole pie): How about another small slice of 
pizza? 
(22) (to an inconsiderate and slovenly housemate): Would you mind very much if I asked 
you to consider cleaning up your room some time this year? 
 
For Kumon-Nakamura et al., a crucial feature of these utterances is their pragmatic 
insincerity: the speaker ‘makes as if’ to perform a certain speech act while intentionally 
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violating one of its sincerity conditions (for instance, the condition on questions that the 
speaker should want to know the answer, or on offers that the offer is being made in good 
faith). While acknowledging that (19) might be seen as echoing the arrogant person’s 
conception of himself, Kumon-Nakamura et al. claim that no such treatment is possible for 
the non-declaratives in (20)–(22).3  
 
A crucial question raised by hybrid attributive-pretence accounts is: what is the relation 
between echoic/attributive use and pretence? Are echoing and pretence two distinct 
mechanisms which can be used independently of each other, or is there only a single 
mechanism, because echoic/attributive use is a subvariety of pretence? A hypothesis 
underlying at least some attributive-pretence accounts seems to be that the only way to echo 
or tacitly report an utterance is by imitating or mimicking it, so that echoic/attributive use is 
indeed a subvariety of pretence. On this approach, not only all ironical utterances but also 
tacit reports of speech and thought such as (14)-(15) above necessarily involve pretence. 
According to Recanati (2007: 223-227), for instance, both irony and free indirect speech are 
tacitly attributive varieties of mimicry or pretence: 
 
The act of assertion is precisely what the speaker does not perform when she says that p 
ironically: rather, she plays someone else’s part and mimics an act of assertion 
accomplished by that person. 
 
If this hypothesis were correct, it would simultaneously confirm the hybrid attributive-
pretence account of irony and explain the parallels between irony and tacit reports of speech 
and thought.  
 
To illustrate, suppose the weather forecaster makes the assertion in (23): 
 
(23) Weather forecaster: It will be lovely weather today. 
 
Then Mary might imitate this speech act in order to report it, as in (24), or to express her own 
mocking, sceptical or critical attitude to it, as in (25): 
 
(24) Mary: Guess what I’ve just heard. The weather is going to be lovely today. 
(25) Mary [in the pouring rain]: The weather is really lovely today. 
 
                                                 
3 In fact, Sperber and Wilson see the echoic account as applying straightforwardly to non-declaratives, 
including ironical questions and imperatives such as (7)-(9) above (discussed in Sperber and Wilson 
(1981; 1995). They analyse over-polite requests such as (21) as ironical echoes of the sort of 
deferential utterance that (it is implied) the hearer sees as his due (Sperber and Wilson, 1981: 311-
312). Sarcastic offers such as (20) might be seen as ironically echoing the sort of utterance a good 
host is expected to produce, or that a guest who thinks his greed has not been noticed might be 
expecting to hear; and so on.  
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This version of the pretence account seems not only to explain the attributive nature of (24) 
and (25) without any appeal to an independent echoic/attributive mechanism, but also to 
capture the intuition that the object of the ironical attitude conveyed in (25) is the speech act 
the weather forecaster performed. It thus appears to offer a genuine alternative to the echoic 
account. 
 
However, there are several problems with the idea that all cases of echoic/attribibutive use 
can be explained by a single (pretence) mechanism. In the first place – as most pretence 
theorists recognise – the object of the ironical attitude need not be a speech act, but may be 
simply a thought that has not been overtly expressed in an utterance. While it makes sense to 
talk of mimicking, imitating or pretending to perform a public speech act, it makes no clear 
sense to talk of mimicking, imitating or pretending to perform a private thought. Pretence 
accounts of tacit reports of thought run into a similar problem. Recanati (2007) suggests that 
these might be handled by broadening the notion of assertion to cover both public speech acts 
and private judgements, so that a speaker who reports either can be described as mimicking 
an “act of assertion”. But this is a purely terminological proposal, and does not solve the 
problem of how a piece of public behaviour can mimic a private thought. By contrast, the 
notion of echoic attributive use, which is based on resemblances in content rather than in 
behaviour, and which therefore need not involve pretence or imitation, applies 
straightforwardly to any representation with a conceptual content, whether this is a public 
representation that can indeed be imitated or a mental representation that cannot. 
 
A second problem with the hypothesis that ironical utterances are imitations of actual (or 
plausibly attributable) speech acts is that even when there is an actual prior speech act that the 
ironical speaker may be seen as echoing, her utterance need not preserve the illocutionary 
force of the original. For instance, Mary might ironically echo the weather forecaster’s 
assertion in (23) by saying to her companion, 
 
(26) a. Isn’t it lovely weather? 
 b. What lovely weather we’re having today! 
 c. Let’s enjoy this lovely weather. 
 
These utterances resemble (23) in propositional content, but not in illocutionary force, and it 
is hard to see how Mary could be seen as imitating the speech act that the weather forecaster 
performed; if she is pretending to perform any speech act in (26a), it is a question rather than 
an assertion. Or recall the ‘Red shoes story’ in section 2 above, where Lucy asks Linus to 
bring her nice red party shoes. According to the pretence account, when Lucy says ironically 
Now I’ll really look pretty, she is pretending to assert that she will really look pretty. 
However, the actual utterance that she is ironically echoing was I want to look pretty for the 
party, and this expresses a desire or wish, rather than a belief or assertion, that she will look 
pretty tonight. The point is quite general, and shows that even when the object of the 
speaker’s ironical attitude is an actual speech act (e.g. the weather forecaster’s assertion in 
(23)), this speech act cannot be identified with the one the speaker is pretending to perform. 
18 
 
 
Finally, it is hard to see how echoic endorsements or echoic questions can be treated as cases 
of pretence. Recall (17a) (You’ve finished your paper. Let’s celebrate), where Sue echoes and 
endorses Jack’s claim that he has finally finished his paper. This is not a ‘pragmatically 
insincere’ speech act in the sense of Kumon-Nakamura et al. (1995): by expressing an 
endorsing attitude to the thought she is echoing, Sue is indirectly committing herself to its 
truth, and all the felicity conditions on assertion are met. Or consider an echoic question 
parallel to (17b) (You’ve finished your paper. Really, completely finished?): 
 
(17)’ b.’ You’ve finished your paper? Really, completely finished? 
 
Here, Sue simultaneously echoes Jack’s assertion and performs a genuine speech act of her 
own. These examples show that echoing can exist independently of pretence, and hence that 
echoing and pretence can come apart. 
 
All this suggests that an adequate attributive-pretence account of irony should incorporate 
two distinct mechanisms which can operate independently of each other. One is a pretence 
mechanism, based on resemblances in public behaviour, which allows the speaker to perform 
an imaginary speech act without being committed to its illocutionary force. The other is an 
attributive mechanism of the type proposed in the echoic account, based on resemblances in 
conceptual content, which allows the speaker to express her own attitude to an attributed 
thought. In ironical utterances, the two mechanisms would combine, allowing the speaker to 
attribute to some actual person or type of person (or people in general) a thought similar in 
content to the imaginary speech act that she is pretending to perform, and to express a 
mocking, scornful or contemptuous attitude to this attributed thought. The resulting 
predictions would largely coincide with those of the echoic account, but would involve two 
distinct mechanisms where the echoic account has only one. 
 
Here is how the pretence accounts described in this section might explain the distinctive 
features of irony discussed above. 
 
The ironical attitude 
Pretence or imitation can be naturally accompanied by the expression of a mocking, scornful 
or contemptuous attitude towards the kind of act one is pretending to perform, or the kind of 
people who would perform it. One can pretend to be an absent-minded professor in order to 
make fun of academics. One can imitate the way a politician smiles or speaks in order to 
make him look silly: impressionists do it all the time. However, this is parody, not irony. The 
mocking or scornful attitude conveyed is not to an echoed thought but to a piece of 
observable behaviour, a form. 
 
Can non-echoic versions of the pretence account explain how it is possible to convey a 
properly ironical attitude: that is, an attitude to an attributed thought? According to these 
accounts, the object of this attitude must be either a speech act that the speaker is pretending 
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to perform or the type of person who would perform it. If the pretend speech act is a parody 
of an actual speech act, there is indeed a target for irony. One morning, Peter looks out of the 
window and says What a lovely day. When it starts to rain soon after, Mary says with 
exaggerated enthusiasm, What a lovely day, simultaneously parodying Peter’s utterance and 
expressing an ironical attitude to its content. But most ironical utterances are not parodies: 
they have no real-life counterpart, and are unlikely ever to have one. If they are pretences, it 
is not at all obvious what is the point of the pretence, what its target is, and hence what makes 
it ironical (cf. Grice’s counterexample). What would be the point of expressing a mocking, 
scornful or contemptuous attitude to a speech act that no one has performed and that, in many 
cases, no reasonable person would perform? On this version of the pretence account, many 
typical cases of irony have no real target. 
 
Hybrid attributive-pretence accounts may of course borrow the explanation of the ironical 
attitude offered by the echoic account. However, they do not add anything to it. Moreover, if 
echoing and pretence are distinct mechanisms which can be used independently of each other, 
as I have tried to show above, it is hard to explain why irony should necessarily involve both 
echoing and pretence, as in hybrid attributive-pretence accounts. 
 
Normative bias 
As noted above, it is quite possible to pretend to perform a speech act without imitating and 
targeting any actual speech act. If irony were achievable simply by performing such a pretend 
speech act with a mocking attitude, as claimed by non-echoic versions of the pretence 
account, nothing in the mechanism of irony so understood would explain the normative bias 
which is not only a distinctive feature of irony but is present from the earliest stages of irony 
comprehension (as shown in section 2). 
 
Hybrid attributive–pretence accounts may again borrow the echoic explanation of the 
normative bias, but it is the echoic element, not the pretence element of such accounts that is 
doing the explanatory work. 
 
The ironical tone of voice 
The pretence account makes a clear prediction about the tone of voice used in irony. If the 
speaker is pretending to make an assertion, we would expect her to maintain the pretence by 
mimicking the tone of voice that someone actually making the assertion did, or would, use. 
This is just what Clark and Gerrig (1984: 122) propose: 
 
In pretense or make-believe, people generally leave their own voices behind for new ones. 
An actor playing Othello assumes a voice appropriate to Othello. An ironist pretending to 
be S' might assume a voice appropriate to S'. To convey an attitude about S', however, the 
ironist will generally exaggerate, or caricature, S'’s voice, as when an ironist affects a 
heavily conspiratorial tone of voice in telling a well-known piece of gossip. … With 
pretense, there is a natural account of the ironic tone of voice. 
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However, this is not the regular ironical tone of voice discussed in much of the literature, 
which takes for granted that the ironical speaker does not leave her own voice behind, but 
may optionally use a tone of voice designed to reflect her own mocking, sceptical or 
contemptuous attitude. What Clark and Gerrig describe is the “overly enthusiastic” tone of 
voice described by Laval and Bert-Erboul (2005), which is parodic rather than ironic. Parody 
does indeed exploit resemblances in behaviour: the speaker simulates a speech act, 
mimicking the tone of voice, form of words, etc. that someone genuinely performing that 
speech act might use. So there are indeed cases where pretence and irony combine, but far 
from being prototypical cases of irony, they are characterised by a tone of voice quite distinct 
from the regular ‘ironical tone of voice’. 
 
The fact that there is a perceptible difference between ironical and parodic tones of voice was 
pointed out in Sperber (1984: 135): 
 
Imagine that Bill keeps saying, Sally is such a nice person, and that Judy totally 
disagrees. Judy might express a derogatory attitude to Bill’s judgement on Sally in two 
superficially similar, but quite perceptibly different, ways. She might imitate Bill and say 
herself, Sally is such a nice person! with an exaggerated tone of enthusiasm or even 
worship. Or she might utter the same sentence but with a tone of contempt, so that there 
will be a contradiction between the literal content of what she says and the tone in which 
she says it. The first tone of voice is indeed one of pretence and mockery. The second 
tone of voice is the ironic tone, the nuances of which have been described by rhetoricians 
since classical antiquity. 
 
According to the echoic account, the distinct tones of voice used in regular and parodic irony 
are linked to different mechanisms: regular irony involves echoing alone, whereas parodic 
irony involves both echoing and pretence. Hence, these two tones of voice are not free 
variants: they may follow different developmental trajectories, be associated with different 
conditions of use and give rise to subtle differences in interpretation, which would be worth 
exploring further. 
 
5. Implications for developmental studies of verbal irony 
 
I have tried to show that echoing and pretence are distinct mechanisms which can be used 
independently of each other. Although echoing and pretence may combine, as they do in 
parodic forms of irony, they do not necessarily combine, and most of the examples of irony 
discussed in this paper involve echoing without any element of pretence. What are the 
implications of this account for experimental studies of irony comprehension, and 
developmental studies in particular? 
 
In an interesting exploratory paper on the forms and functions of irony in conversations 
among adults, Gibbs (2000/2007: 339) took ‘irony’ in a very broad sense, to cover 
“jocularity, sarcasm, hyperbole, rhetorical questions and understatements”. As his discussion 
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makes clear, he is using ‘irony’ not as a theoretical term but in something like its ordinary-
language sense, to cover a range of loosely related phenomena, some of which are cases of 
echoic use, others involve pretence, and still others may have no more in common with 
typical cases of irony such as (1)-(2) than the evocation of a mocking attitude or some 
discrepancy between representation and reality. The breadth of the notion of irony used in 
much of the experimental literature is underlined in a study by Leggitt and Gibbs (2000: 5-6), 
who give the following operational definitions and illustrations of the “various forms of 
irony” discussed: 
 
Irony: “The speaker’s observation of a contradictory state of affairs, but not directly 
critical of the addressee.” Sarcasm: “A statement that clearly contradicts the knowable 
state of affairs, and is harshly critical toward the addressee.” Hyperbole/ Overstatement: 
“A description of the state of affairs in obviously exaggerated terms.” Understatement: 
“A description of a state of affairs as clearly less important than it appeared in context.” 
Satire: “A statement that appears to the support the addressee, yet the speaker actually 
disagrees and mocks the addressee.” Rhetorical question: A question that is obviously 
false in a given context.” 
 
Example 1 (Leggitt & Gibbs 2000: 23) 
You are going with a group of friends to a movie. All of them want to see the same 
movie except for you. You say you will leave them if you don’t get your way. Jennifer 
thinks you won’t change your mind, and says: 
Ironic:  We always get along so well.  
Sarcastic:  You are being so mature 
Overstatement This is the end of the world 
Understatement You are being a little silly 
Satire/Parody: You will want to see a cartoon 
Rhetorical question Do you know how to compromise? 
 
Similar operational definitions and illustrations are quite widely used in the developmental 
literature. I have tried to show above that regular irony and parodic irony involve different 
mechanisms, which may follow different developmental trajectories . I now want to argue 
that some of the phenomena currently treated as forms of irony in the developmental 
literature show none of the distinctive features of irony in most of their uses, and are not 
inherently ironical at all. 
 
Consider jocularity, one of the phenomena often treated as ironical in the experimental 
literature (Gibbs, 2000; Pexman et al., 2005). As examples of jocularity, Gibbs (2000/2007: 
350) gives (27)-(28): 
 
(27) (to someone who has just solved a difficult problem): Dumb bitch! 
(28) (by someone known to be a good lover): I’m not all that good in the sack anyways, so 
you’re not missing out on much. 
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He notes that among the jocular utterances in his corpus of conversations among students, 
there were significantly more negative statements such as (27)-(28) which were used to 
convey a positive meaning than positive statements used to convey a negative meaning. In 
other words, jocular utterances do not exhibit the normative bias widely noted in the 
rhetorical literature and confirmed in experimental studies by Kreuz and Glucksbeerg (1989) 
and Hancock, Dunham and Purdy (2000). Gibbs takes this result to underline the inadequacy 
of traditional descriptions of irony as a matter of saying one thing and meaning the opposite. 
But as suggested above, the normative bias is a distinctive feature of all genuine cases of 
irony, including declaratives, as in (1)-(2), interrogatives, imperatives or hyperboles such as 
(7)-(9), or exclamatives, of the type used in sections 3 and 4. Given this normative bias, for 
(27)-(28) to be genuine cases of irony, the speaker would have to be ironically echoing a 
doubt or suspicion that someone had previously entertained or expressed. But there is no 
evidence for this in Gibbs’ examples, and the fact that this type of negative utterance occurs 
so frequently in his corpus suggests that some different, non-echoic mechanism is being used. 
 
In fact, example (27) looks like a case of banter or teasing similar to (12) above (repeated 
here for convenience): 
 
(12) (to a close friend who has just come in): Here comes trouble! 
 
Both examples fit the definition proposed in Leech’s ‘Banter Principle’: 
 
In order to show solidarity to the hearer, say something which is (i) obviously untrue, 
and (ii) obviously impolite to the hearer. (Leech 1983: 149) 
 
Although banter and irony may be similar in form, banter exhibits none of the distinctive 
features of irony: it does not express a mocking, scornful or contemptuous attitude to an 
echoed thought, it does not show a normative bias, and it does not use the regular ironical 
tone of voice. In fact, banter is probably best analysed as a non-ironic form of pretence. If so, 
including it in developmental studies of irony sheds no light on how the mechanisms for 
irony comprehension develop, although the study of banter, jocularity and teasing are 
interesting in their own right. 
 
Or consider the range of examples labelled “ironic complements” in the developmental 
literature. In Hancock, Dunham and Purdy’s (2005) ‘Weight-Lifter Story’ (repeated below 
for convenience), B’s remark You’re really bad at lifting weights was regarded as an ironic 
compliment regardless of whether it was preceded by a boast (I’m good at lifting weights) or 
an expression of self-doubt (I’m really bad at lifting weights):  
 
 Weight-Lifter Story (complimentary version) 
 A:  I’m [good/bad] at lifting weights.  [A lifts weight] 
 B: You really are bad at lifting weights.  [Ironic compliment] 
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But because of the normative bias shown by genuine cases of irony, a negative remark such 
as You’re really bad at lifting weights is only properly regarded as an ironic compliment if it 
echoes a doubt or fear about A’s performance that has previously been entertained or 
expressed. Thus, if uttered in response to A’s self-critical remark I’m bad at lifting weights, it 
would be a genuine case of irony. By contrast, if uttered in response to A’s boastful remark 
I’m good at lifting weights, it would exhibit none of the distinctive features of irony, and 
would be better analysed as case of banter or teasing (i.e. of non-ironic pretence). Yet the 
remark You’re really bad at lifting weights is quite generally regarded as an ‘ironic 
compliment’ in either condition (Filippova and Astington, 2010, Filippova, forthcoming). It 
would be interesting to investigate possible developmental differences between the two types 
of case. 
 
Finally, consider hyperbole, which seems to be widely regarded as a form of irony not only in 
the experimental literature but in many treatments of rhetoric in the US. It is certainly 
possible for irony and hyperbole to combine, as in (9) above, which implicates that the 
lecture was very boring indeed: 
 
(9) (after a boring lecture): I was on the edge of my seat. 
 
Here, the use of hyperbole is naturally seen as a cue to the speaker’s mocking, scornful or 
contemptuous attitude. This was experimentally tested by Kreuz and Roberts (1995), who 
gave adult participants alternative versions of scenarios such as the following, containing one 
or other of the italicised sentences, and asked them to judge how likely it was that the 
italicised sentence was being used ironically: 
 
Harry was helping Pat move into her new apartment. “Don’t worry, I can move this 
grandfather clock by myself, said Harry, who was very muscular. 
Harry only managed to tip the clock over, and it crashed to the floor. 
Pat looked up from some boxes she was moving, and said Thanks for helping me out / 
I’ll never be able to repay you for your help! 
 
The results showed that the hyperbolic version I’ll never be able to repay you for your help 
was judged more likely to be ironical than the non-hyperbolic version Thanks for helping me 
out. These combinations of hyperbole and irony show all three distinctive features of irony: 
normative bias, expression of a mocking, scornful or contemptuous attitude to an attributed 
thought, and possibility of using the regular ironical tone of voice. 
 
But hyperbole is not necessarily ironical. In classical rhetoric, it is seen as much closer to 
metaphor than to irony. For instance (29)-(30) would be understood in very similar ways, and 
there is room for debate about whether (29) should be classed as a case of metaphor or 
hyperbole: 
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(29) (to a very tall man) Wow! You’re a giant! 
(30) Wow! You’re the tallest man I’ve ever seen! 
 
A recent corpus analysis of the uses of hyperbole in English by Claridge (2011) clearly shows 
the links between hyperbole and metaphor but barely mentions any connection with irony. 
Yet examples similar to (30) are routinely included in the data for developmental studies of 
irony comprehension. For instance, Recchia et al. (2010: 256) treat both hyperbole and 
understatement as forms of irony, and define them as follows: 
 
The literal and intended meanings of hyperbole and understatement differ in strength, but 
not valence. Compared to the intended meaning, the literal meaning of hyperbole is 
exaggerated (e.g. I have the biggest sandwich in the world) and the literal meaning of 
understatement is muted (e.g. I’m just a tiny bit angry at you right now).  
 
But the forms of hyperbole and understatement used in their definitions show none of the 
distinctive features of irony: they do not express a mocking, scornful or contemptuous 
attitude to an echoed thought, exhibit no normative bias, and would not use the regular 
ironical tone of voice. The same point applies to the examples of overstatement and 
understatement given in Leggitt and Gibbs’ (2000) Example 1 above, and to many of the 
rhetorical questions used in the literature. In other words, hyperbole, understatement and 
rhetorical questions are not inherently ironical, and should not be expected to follow the same 
developmental trajectory as genuine cases of irony. These phenomena exploit a disparate 
range of mechanisms which are well worth studying in their own right, and new theoretical 
accounts and experimental paradigms are needed to prise them apart. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
Developmental studies of irony comprehension – even under the broad conception of irony 
used in many of these studies – provide valuable insights into the nature and development of 
the echoic/attributive mechanism used in both regular and parodic cases of irony. Because 
regular and parodic irony have not been systematically distinguished, possible differences in 
their developmental trajectories have not been systematically explored. For instance, children 
use pretence very early, and we might expect to find non-echoic parodies of speech acts 
(exaggerated  imitations  used to mock a piece of behaviour or a person) being produced and 
understood much earlier than regular or parodic forms of irony. The fact that regular and 
parodic irony each has a characteristic and perceptibly different tone of voice provides a 
useful means of distinguishing the two. 
 
I have argued that of the broader range of phenomena commonly treated as forms of irony, 
hyperbole, understatement, rhetorical questions and various forms of jocularity or teasing are 
not inherently ironical, and involve a rather disparate range of mechanisms. For instance, 
relevance theorists treat hyperbole is a type of loose use of language closely related to 
metaphor (Wilson and Carston, 2007; Sperber and Wilson, 2008), which does not involve the 
25 
 
expression of a characteristic attitude or tone of voice, and combines as easily with non-
echoic forms of parody as with irony. By contrast, I have suggested that jocularity, banter and 
teasing may be non-echoic forms of parody or pretence, and may be produced and understood 
much earlier than genuine cases of echoic irony. Developmental studies of hyperbole, banter 
and teasing could provide valuable insights into how these mechanisms develop, and help us 
construct adequate theories. 
 
In fact, developmental studies have already brought to light an interesting feature of jokes 
which links them more closely to irony than to metaphor, and which an adequate theory 
ought to explain: in at least some of their uses, they appear to require a higher order of 
metarepresentational ability than metaphor, and to correlate with success in second-order 
false-belief tasks. Many of these studies test the child’s ability to distinguish between jokes – 
which are not intended to deceive an audience – and lies – which are (Leekam, 1991; 
Sullivan, Winner and Hopfield, 1995; Winner et al., 1998; Sullivan, Winner and Tager-
Flusberg, 2003). The results show a clear correlation between the ability to attribute second-
order mental states (e.g. Frank knows that Grandpa knows that he did not clean up the 
dishes), and to tell lies from jokes. Interestingly, children who fail to distinguish lies from 
jokes tend to treat jokes as lies, rather than vice versa (this fits with a comment by Creusere, 
2000: 29 that in early studies of irony comprehension, adults misinterpreted sarcasm as 
deception 46% of the time.)  
 
In a recent developmental study, Mascaro and Sperber (2010) have traced the development of 
the ability to cope with intentional deception and shown that it has two sub-components 
which are not fully in place until around the age of six: the epistemic ability to recognize false 
utterances as such and draw appropriate inferences, and the mindreading ability to recognise 
that the speaker intends to conceal from them her opinion that a certain proposition is false. It 
would be interesting to explore the implications of this work for the understanding of both 
irony and jokes. 
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